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Abstract
We explore the link between fi rms’ dollar bond borrowing and their FX-hedged funding 
opportunities, as refl ected in a positive corporate basis (the relative cost of local to 
synthetic currency borrowing). Consistent with previous research, we fi rst document that 
fi rms substitute domestic for dollar borrowing when they have higher dollar revenues 
or long-term assets and when the corporate basis widens. Importantly, our novel 
fi rm-level dataset enables to show that when these funding opportunities appear, the 
currency substitution is stronger for very high-grade fi rms, as they can offer to investors 
close substitutes for safe dollar assets. However, fi rms with higher dollar revenues or 
long-term assets do not react to changes in the corporate basis. Altogether, the 
composition of dollar borrowers shifts when the basis widens, as high-grade fi rms gain 
importance, relative to fi rms with operational needs.
Keywords: covered interest rate parity, credit spread, debt issuance, dollar convenience 
yield, foreign exchange rate hedge, limits of arbitrage.
JEL classifi cation: E44, F3, F55, G12, G15, G23, G28, G32.
Resumen
En este trabajo se estudia la relación entre la fi nanciación de sociedades no fi nancieras 
con bonos denominados en dólares y las oportunidades de fi nanciación sin riesgo 
de tipo de cambio en dicha divisa. Estas oportunidades surgen cuando la base 
es positiva, es decir, cuando resulta más ventajoso emitir un bono en dólares y convertir 
posteriormente el importe resultante en moneda local. De acuerdo con la literatura 
anterior, mostramos, en primer lugar, que las empresas emiten bonos en dólares en 
lugar de hacerlo en la moneda local cuando sus ingresos o activos a largo plazo están 
denominados en dólares y cuando la base es positiva. Además, nuestros datos a 
nivel de empresa nos permiten aportar nueva evidencia empírica, según la cual 
son las empresas con una categoría crediticia muy elevada las que realizan dicha 
sustitución, dada la existencia de oportunidades de fi nanciación. El motivo es la 
preferencia de los inversores por activos muy seguros denominados en dólares. Sin 
embargo, las empresas con ingresos o activos en dólares, es decir, con necesidades 
operacionales en esa divisa, no reaccionan a dichas oportunidades de fi nanciación. Por 
todo ello, la composición del conjunto de empresas emisoras de bonos denominados 
en dólares cambia en un escenario de base positiva: las empresas con una categoría 
crediticia muy elevada ganan importancia, en detrimento de aquellas con necesidades 
operacionales en dólares. 
Palabras clave: paridad cubierta de tipo de interés, spread de crédito, emisión de bonos, 
convenience yield del dólar, cobertura del tipo de cambio, límites de arbitraje.
Códigos JEL: E44, F3, F55, G12, G15, G23, G28, G32.
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2 The strong dollar demand during this period led to the widening of the CIP deviation, which became large enough 
to compensate for the bond yield differentials. 
1. Introduction 
Dollar bonds constitute the major alternative to local currency debt for non-US firms, an aspect 
which research relates to favorable funding conditions or strong operational needs. For 
instance, non-US firms with dollar revenues (Gopinath and Stein, 2019) or long-term assets 
(Allayannis et al., 2001) may issue dollar bonds to hedge their asset-side exposures. 
Simultaneously, dollar borrowing is associated with strong safe asset demand that could lead 
to FX-hedged cost-saving opportunities (Liao, 2017), in particular for high-grade issuers as 
shown by Krishnamurthy and Lustig (2019). In any case, dollar borrowing seems intimately 
related to various firm-level attributes, whose role may change over time.   
In this paper, we study how dollar borrowing by non-financial firms headquartered in advanced 
economies relates to both firm attributes and FX-hedged funding opportunities. The latter arise 
when the corporate basis, defined as the relative cost of local to synthetic currency borrowing, 
turns positive. For instance, a positive dollar-euro corporate basis opened in 2012, reflecting 
that issuing bonds in dollars and swapping the proceeds back into euros was cheaper than 
directly borrowing in euros.2 We find that, on average, non-US firms increase their dollar 
issuances when the corporate basis widens but the response differs across types of firm. Very 
high-grade firms react more to the widening of the corporate basis, since they can offer to 
investors closer substitutes for safe dollar assets. Firms with dollar revenues or long-term assets 
do not respond to changes in the corporate basis, although their share of dollar borrowing 
always remains high due to their operational needs for dollar funding.  
As a first step of our analysis, we estimate the corporate bases for a series of currencies, relative 
to the US dollar. We follow the well-established method used by Gilchrist, Yankov and 
Zakrajsek (2009), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), and Liao (2017) and obtain the residualized 
credit spread for each currency as a residual from a cross-sectional regression of bond spreads, 
controlling for bond and firm-specific characteristics. We select all the bonds issued by the 
subsample of non-financial firms that have issued bonds in at least one currency. Then we 
estimate a bond-pricing model, regressing the spread over swap rates of the corporate bonds 
on a number of bond and issuer-characteristics, including a dummy for each currency of 
denomination. The estimated coefficients for these currency dummy variables are the ones that 
determine the residualized credit spreads, which following Liao (2017) we interpret as 
differences in the price of credit risk across currencies. For instance, the differential in the price 
of credit risk of the pairwise EUR-USD is the difference between the coefficients associated 
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with the euro (EUR) and the dollar (USD) dummy variables. Finally, we obtain the corporate 
basis as the sum of the cross-currency basis (ie the deviation from the covered interest rate 
parity, CIP), and the residualized corporate credit spread (ie the deviation in the price of risk 
across currencies).  
Importantly, in the analysis we use the corporate basis, which is a risk-adjusted differential in 
the corporate covered credit spread, obtained comparing the yields of bonds of same issuers in 
pairs of currencies (Liao, 2017). Such a comparison is particularly needed for the analysis of 
the bond market in the last decade, when discrepancies in the price of risk might have widened, 
constituting a major source of funding opportunities. This differentiates our paper from 
previous research, which uses broader measures for FX-hedged funding opportunities 
(McBrady et al., 2013; Black and Munro, 2010), or sovereign yield differentials (McBrady and 
Schill, 2007).   
In our baseline analysis, we focus on non-financial companies headquartered in the euro area, 
Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Canada, analysing their bond issuances during the 
period 2007–2016 in the respective local currency, and the dollar. The sample selection seeks 
to focus the analysis on the firms that borrow across currencies for both operational needs 
and/or cost-saving reasons. Our focus on the main advanced economies allows us to leave aside 
possible concerns regarding borrowings due to incomplete home-currency markets. In other 
words, our dataset ensures us to work under the hypothesis that market frictions are limited and 
that currencies are quite close substitutes for the issuers. This is important since previous 
research has shown that market incompleteness is a driver of foreign currency issuance for 
companies in emerging economies - for instance, if they need to raise long term funding (Black 
and Munro, 2010).  
Our model of currency switching is based on Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) and 
Bruno and Shin (2017). The dependent variable is the fraction of dollar to total (dollar plus 
local) bond borrowing, at the firm-quarter level. Given that a linear prediction of a proportion 
variable bounded between zero and one could lead to some specification errors (Cook et al. 
2008), we use a generalized linear model (GLM) with a logistic link function as in O’Connor 
Keefe and Yaghoubi (2016). We explore how the share of dollar borrowing relates to the 
corporate basis and two key firm-level attributes: their operational needs – reflected in dollar 
revenues and long-term assets – and their credit risk. As control variables, we include a 
comprehensive number of firm-specific and time-varying demand factors of foreign currency 
borrowing.  
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3 We use data on the supplementary notes of firm financial statements to measure firms’ dollar assets exposures. 
In these notes companies breakdown their financial statements (balance-sheet, income and cash-flow statements) 
by key operating segments. In particular, we use the geographical breakdown of financial statements, in which 
firms detail the countries that account for a material fraction of their revenues or assets to proxy if a firm has dollar 
exposures (i.e., it is exposed to the United States or the Americas) or not. We posit that a firm has dollar asset-
side exposures if has long-term assets or revenues in dollars. Data limitations prevent us exploring the role of euro 
asset-side exposures.  
Second, we explore the role of dollar asset-side exposures, measured with their dollar revenues 
and long-term assets.3 We find that the share of dollar borrowing is higher for firms with dollar 
long-term assets or revenues, which suggests that firms match the currency composition of 
asset and liabilities. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the importance of the dollar in 
international debt markets relates to dollar invoicing in international trade (Gopinath and Stein, 
2019), and also with the findings of Allayannis et al. (2001), Aabo (2006), or Hoberg and Moon 
(2017), among others. In addition, we show that firms with local (and no dollar) asset exposures 
increase their dollar borrowing when the corporate basis widens. This novel evidence suggests 
As anticipated above, our first finding is that a widening of the corporate basis has a positive 
impact on the share of dollar bonds as a fraction of total (dollar plus local currency) bond 
borrowing. This indicates that, when cost-saving opportunities arise, non-US firms increase 
dollar borrowings. The analysis of different subsamples shows that this result is stronger over 
the period 2013-2016, when distortions in credit markets and CIP deviations were larger. We 
find similar results when we examine the substitution between local currency and EUR 
borrowing by non-euro area firms confirming that firms respond to funding opportunities 
associated with covered FX borrowing independently of the currency employed as the one of 
reference.  
Our results relate our paper to the literature on dollar borrowing, considering firms as 
opportunistic borrowers such as Black and Munro (2010), McBrady et al. (2013) or Liao 
(2017). Our major contribution is the analysis of firms’ responses to cost-saving opportunities 
depending on two firms’ crucial attributes: their credit risk and their asset-side exposures to the 
dollar.   
We proceed in two steps. First, to examine the role of firms’ credit risk, we augment the 
baseline empirical model adding interactions between the corporate basis and proxies for the 
firm’s risk (measured with the rating, an Altman Z-score-based measure, and the distance-to-
default). We find that the dollar-borrowing share of safer firms is more sensitive to the 
corporate basis. This suggests that they can offer to investors close substitutes of safe dollar 
assets (Krisnamurthy and Lustig, 2019).  
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4 For instance, Nippon Telegraph is an example of a very high-grade Japanese corporation with no dollar exposure, 
which has tapped dollar bond markets recently, as the JPY-USD corporate basis has turned positive.  
5 Bloomberg Global Index plus additional major indices: Bloomberg European 500 Index, FTSE 350, CRSP US 
Total Market Index, S&P/ASX 200 Index, FTSE All-Share Index, S&P/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite 
Index, FTSE Canada Index.  
firms across the six economic areas listed before is as follows: 2,450 of firms are based in the 
United States, 395 in the euro area, 448 in Japan, 301 in the United Kingdom, 193 in Canada, 
and 136 in Switzerland.  
We construct a matched firm-bond level dataset, merging firms’ financial statements with their 
bond issuances on a consolidated basis. More specifically, our sample consists of 7,211 non-
financial firms that were constituents of the main global equity indexes as of December 2016.5 
We restrict our sample to companies headquartered in the United States, the euro area, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Canada. This sample selection seeks to focus our 
analysis on those firms that borrow across currencies for hedging operational needs and/or 
opportunistic reasons but not due to incomplete home-currency markets. The distribution of 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents 
the empirical model used to obtain covered credit spreads. Section 4 describes the model used 
to study currency choice. Section 5 summarizes the main results on dollar borrowing by non-
US firms and presents several extensions and robustness tests. In Section 6, we show that the 
risky firms and those with no assets and revenues in dollar are more sensitive to cost-saving 
opportunities. Section 7 summarises the main conclusions.  
2. Data 
that they substitute local for synthetic local borrowing. We confirm that this result is not related 
to firms’ size, orthogonalizing asset-side exposures and total assets.   
Altogether, our results underscore that firm-level attributes are key determinants of their 
reliance on dollar bond borrowing. Firms with dollar asset-side exposures borrow in dollars to 
hedge them independently of the sign of the corporate basis. Firms also issue dollar bonds to 
exploit FX-hedged cost-saving opportunities – but firm attributes play an important role. Safe 
firms and those without dollar asset-side exposures represent the type of firms that respond 
more frequently to such opportunities.4 As a result, the widening of the corporate basis changes 
the composition of dollar borrowers: issuers became safer, and the fraction of borrowers with 
dollar assets or revenues decreases.  
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6 We drop duplicated firms in case a company has more than one common share. All the data is from Thompson 
Reuters Eikon.  
Besides the information on financial statements (assets and liabilities balance-sheet, cash-flow, 
and income statements), our dataset contains information on the firm functional currency, its 
two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, and the firm 
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). The functional currency indicates the 
currency associated with the environment where the company conducts most of its activity. 
Multinationals usually conduct part of their activities using other currencies. Thus, if firms seek 
to match the currency composition of assets and liabilities, they might raise foreign currency 
debt. The NAICS code is an industry identifier that serves as a proxy for (time-invariant) 
operational demand for foreign currency. Finally, we use the ISIN as a common identifier, 
which is available for all companies in our database since all firms are listed.6  
In addition to firm-level information, we retrieve (from Thompson Reuters Eikon) all the bonds 
issued by non-financial corporations over the period 2007Q1–2016Q4. Bond information 
includes the amount, currency of denomination, issuance and maturity date. For each bond, we 
identify the direct issuer, the guarantor, and the ultimate parent company of the issuer. This 
information is essential for a proper matching with the firm dataset, given that we classify 
bonds as liabilities of the guarantor. If no entity explicitly guarantees them, bonds are classified 
as liabilities of the ultimate parent company and if the company is not an affiliate, they are 
classified as liabilities of the direct issuer. This is equivalent to consolidating bonds at the 
ultimate parent level, but treating standalone affiliates (which issue bonds without the legal 
backing of its parent companies) as independent companies. Next, we construct firm-quarter 
series of bond issuances, with currency breakdowns for: US dollar, euro, British pound, Swiss 
franc, Japanese yen, and Canadian dollar. In the analysis, when this does not create confusion, 
we will identify the “US dollar” simply as the dollar. 
The two datasets are matched using the firm ISIN, which uniquely identifies entities in both 
datasets. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for key firm-level variables for non-US firms 
issuing dollar bonds and for non-euro area (EA) firms issuing EUR bonds. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
Table 2 reports information on the number of bonds issued in each of the six currencies over 
time in total (Panel A), by local (Panel B) and by foreign (Panel C) issuers in our sample. The 
US dollar and the euro are the two foreign currencies most widely used in bond issuances. We 
will conduct our baseline analysis on the issuances in US dollars as the foreign currency, while 
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7 These breakdowns seek to show which business lines/regions are important for firms, and to illustrate how they 
contribute to companies’ financial performance. 
at country level but at a broader region level. Thus, we assume that a given firm has dollar 
asset-side exposures if it has long-term assets in, or revenues from, the “dollar region”. To 
compute these exposures, we use the last available financial statement for each firm. We are 
assuming that any exposure to the Americas region implies some exposure to the dollar and 
that the exposures are relatively uniform through the whole sample period. We explore the 
evolution of the geographical breakdown of exposures for a handful of firms of different 
We also use information on the prices of all bonds (denominated in any of the six currencies) 
issued by any firm around the world to obtain the residualized corporate basis, as will be 
detailed in the next section. Finally, we use the supplementary notes of the financial statements, 
available at Thompson Reuters Eikon, to measure firms’ dollar assets exposures. These notes 
are compulsory under IFRS and the US GAAP – to which all firms in our sample are subject – 
and include additional information not included in the balance-sheet, income, and cash-flow 
statements. Specifically, we exploit the fact that companies break down some financial 
statement items by key operating segment, such as business lines and geographical regions.7 
We focus on the geographical breakdown of long-term assets and revenues. The appendix 
contains an example for one firm in our sample.  
We examine the full list of categories (names of countries and regions) and define as a “dollar 
region” either the United States or the Americas region, when the information is not detailed 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
we will use the euro for some checks. There are insufficient bond issuances in other foreign 
currencies for us to conduct a proper econometric analysis. 
We exclude US firms from our baseline analysis. Unlike firms in any of the other five 
countries/economic areas, US firms finance themselves mainly in dollars and the proportion of 
bonds issued in foreign currency is only around 10% (see Figure 1). Given such a home bias, 
it seems reasonable to exclude them when studying the substitution of local vs foreign currency 
bonds. Nevertheless, we extend the baseline analysis to include US firms considering issuances 
in EUR as the foreign currency (ie, the second most frequent currency for bond issuances in 
foreign currency), which will help us to validate the main results. The distribution of firms 
issuing dollar bonds by region is the following: 253 in Japan, 208 in the Euro Area, 126 in the 
United Kingdom, 101 in Canada, and 41 in Switzerland. 
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8 Constructing a time-varying measure is difficult, as the lack of harmonisation over time unfortunately does not 
allow a perfect comparison among the categories that need to be examined. Since exposures tend to be stable over 
time, we think there is little gain in defining a time-varying measure.  
3. Measuring the corporate basis 
We gauge the cost-saving opportunities of conducting synthetic local currency borrowing 
relative to local currency borrowing by calculating a measure of corporate basis. The corporate 
basis is the sum of the currency c-USD deviation in the covered interest rate parity, and the 
differential in the residualized credit spread. The more positive the corporate basis, the cheaper 
it is to borrow in the foreign currency relative to home currency borrowing. 
3.1. Residualized corporate credit spreads 
We use individual bond yields to compute the residualized credit spreads, which are 
differentials in credit risk spreads across currencies. We follow the methodology proposed by 
Liao (2017), and hence we estimate these differentials from monthly corporate bond spreads, 
which are calculated as the average bond yield in a given month over the swap rate with a 
similar maturity.  
Our initial database includes a total of 147,579 bonds issued during the period 2004Q1–
2016Q4 by any firm around the world with a maturity at issuance equal or larger than one year. 
Since we are interested in price differentials between the six major currencies: US dollar 
(USD), euro, (EUR) British pound (GBP), Swiss franc (CHF), Japanese yen (JPY), and 
Canadian dollar (CAD). Hence, we disregard bonds issued in other currencies. In addition, we 
exclude all bonds without an ISIN, since we need it to match bond prices in secondary markets. 
This leaves us with 50,971 bonds, for which we have the original and residual maturity, amount 
issued, and currency of denomination. Finally, we drop callable bonds and those in which the 
issuer is not identified. The final sample consists of 40,614 corporate bonds, which have been 
issued by a total of 5,082 companies.9  
To construct differentials in how credit risk is priced across pairs of currencies, we restrict our 
analysis to those issuers with outstanding bonds in at least two of the six currencies considered 
in our analysis, one of them being the reference currency. We construct two differentials in 
which the currencies of reference are the US dollar and the euro. Thus, for the case in which 
sectors, and conclude that the above assumption is not restrictive, since exposures tend to be 
stable over time.8 
                                                            
9 As in the firm-bond level dataset, we define the issuer as the bond-guarantor, ultimate parent company of the 
issuer, or direct issuer. 
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where ??? denotes a vector of currency-quarter fixed effects (ie, dummy variables that are equal 
to one for each quarter and each of the six currencies considered in our paper, where c = CAD, 
CHF, EUR, GBP, JPY, USD) and zero otherwise. ?? indicates firm fixed effects, which control 
for any other bond characteristics that are common at the firm level (ie, industry, location,…). 
We classify bonds in several buckets of maturities (ie, 1-3 years, 3-7 years, 7-10 years, and 
more than 10 years) and use a set of fixed effects for each of these buckets (???. Another 
important dimension to consider is the bond term and for this reason we use fixed effects for 
five age buckets (??): less than 1 year, 1-3 years, 3-7 years, 7-10 years, and more than 10 years. 
In addition, we use fixed effects for investment grade and high-yield rating categories (??? 
based on Standard & Poor’s ratings on long-term debt. The bonds whose rating is not available 
are classified in the same bucket as those with high-yield category. Bond spreads are retrieved 
The estimated vector of coefficients ???? measures the residualized credit spread controlling for 
all other observables. Following Liao (2017), we use the residualized credit spread differential 
to measure the “law-of-one-price” violation of credit risk between currencies. Specifically, for 
the case in which we use the dollar (euro) as the reference currency, the currency-quarter fixed 
effect estimates ???? ? ??????? (???? ? ???????? measure the deviation in the pricing of credit risk 
in currency c relative to the pricing of credit risk in the dollar (euro). We denote, hereafter, the 
differential in the residualized credit spread of a given currency c with respect to the dollar and 
the euro as ???????  and ??????? , respectively. This estimation method enables us to match bonds 
the US dollar (euro) is the reference currency, we use issuers with outstanding bonds in both 
the US dollar (euro) and any of the other five currencies. In total 416 (398) firms, out of the 
5,082 firms considered, have issued bonds in US dollar (euro) and any other of the remaining 
five currencies over the sample period. Issuance in more than two currencies is infrequent: 103 
firms have issued in three currencies, 45 in four, 24 in five, and 12 in the six currencies 
considered.  
The number of bonds issued by companies that tap more than one currency market at the same 
time is 6,130 conditioned on having issued in dollars and 6,058 conditioned on having issued 
in euros. Next, we estimate for each quarter t the following cross-sectional regression, in which 
the bond spread over the swap curve for each bond i, denominated in currency c, issued by firm 
f , with time-to-maturity m, age a, and rating r, is regressed on a series of bond characteristics, 
an issuer dummy, and a currency dummy: 
???????? ? ??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????????? ? ???????? ? ?????????????? 
from Datastream whereas, as described in Section 2, bond-specific variables are obtained from 
Thompson Reuters Eikon.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2005
?????? ? ?????? ????????    (2) 
Following Liao (2017), we measure the deviation in the interest parity by means of the five-
year cross-currency swap basis. Persistent and wide cross-currency swap bases (?????? ) have 
emerged for several currencies over the last years, as a result of strong FX hedging demand 
and limits to arbitrage due to financial intermediaries’ balance-sheet constraints (Sushko et al., 
2016 and Du et al, 2018). Figure 3 depicts the corporate basis, which summarises the FX-
hedged funding opportunities for corporate borrowers. Positive corporate bases emerge for 
several currencies despite negative residualized credit spreads, since constraints on the capacity 
of intermediaries to provide FX hedges can result in the emergence of wider CIP deviations 
(cross-currency basis). A positive EUR-USD basis means that borrowing in dollars and 
swapping to euros saves some basis points. The corporate basis of euro area firms became 
positive during short periods of 2009, 2011 and 2012 (see Figure 4). 
< Insert Figures 3 and 4 here > 
3.2. Corporate basis: currency risk-adjusted differential in corporate covered credit 
spreads 
The corporate basis gauges the cost-saving opportunities of conducting synthetic local currency 
borrowing relative to local currency borrowing. In a synthetic local currency bond issuance, 
the firm issues in foreign currency (in this case, the dollar), and swaps the proceeds into its 
home currency. Thus, the corporate basis of currency c relative to the USD, ?????? , is 
equivalent to the sum of the currency c-USD deviation in the covered interest rate parity 
(?????? ) and the residualized credit spread (??????? ) : 
of similar characteristics issued by the same firm, with the only difference being their currency 
of denomination. 
Figure 2 plots the differentials of the EUR, CAD, JPY, CHF, and GBP relative to the USD, 
over the period 2007Q1–2016Q4. Differentials are in general negative, signalling that the price 
of risk has been cheaper in all currency areas, relative to the dollar bond markets. However, 
the differential sometimes reaches positive territory, with the exception of the differential with 
EUR and JPY, which remains constantly negative. It is worth remembering that these 
differentials are computed controlling for issuer characteristics and therefore they represent 
cost-saving opportunities associated with the currency of the denomination of bonds. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
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10 See Kieschnick and McCullough (2003) or Cook et al (2008) for more details on the specification errors in 
using a linear prediction equation to model a dependent variable that is a fraction. 
Finally, we include several economic area/country lagged specific variables (?????) that could 
also affect the willingness of firms to borrow in foreign currency. These additional controls 
are: (i) exchange rate volatility; (ii) public debt to GDP; (iii) current account balance to GDP; 
(iv) GDP growth; and (v) the sovereign yield differential based on the five-year maturity. All 
explanatory variables are standardized (ie, mean zero and standard deviation one) to facilitate 
their interpretation and comparison. The standard errors are clustered at the currency- quarter 
level. 
where G(.) is the logistic link function, ?? ??? ??? indicate currency, year-quarter and rating 
category fixed effects. The variable ????????  refers to the corporate basis defined in equation (2) 
and accounts for the funding opportunities in the local currency c in quarter t as compared to 
dollar. ???? is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm has long-term assets or revenues 
denominated in dollars (ie, asset-side exposure). As discussed in the previous section, since we 
focus on switching between the home currency and the dollar, we have defined the measures 
of funding cost differentials in the home currency relative to the dollar. In addition we include 
4. Empirical model 
Our dependent variable is the fraction borrowed in dollar-denominated bonds by a given non-
US firm i, in country c , with rating category r, in quarter t relative to the sum of local currency 
and dollar borrowing in that quarter (FCRicrt). This variable takes the value of one when all the 
debt is raised in dollars, and zero when is raised in the home currency. To mitigate the 
estimation problems derived from the fact that the dependent variable is a proportion variable 
bounded between zero and one, we use a generalized linear model (GLM) with a logistic link 
function as in O’Connor Keefe and Yaghoubi (2016):10 
?????????????????? ????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? 
(3) 
a set of lagged firm specific control variables (?????) that capture time-varying characteristics 
which can be related to ability to borrow in foreign currency. These firm characteristics are: (i) 
firm size (measured with the logarithm of total assets), (ii) price-to-book ratio, (iii) operating 
margin, (iv) a dummy variable that indicates if the firm had previously issued bonds in dollar 
and (v) firm risk (measured by the leverage ratio). 
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11 We consider that the post-crisis period starts after ECB President Mario Draghi’s promise in May 2012 to do 
“whatever it takes” to preserve the euro.  
The signs associated with the control variables are consistent with the different capital structure 
theories summarized in Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) for the case of the currency 
choice. The sign obtained for firm size is positive and significant, consistent with the market 
depth hypothesis according to which large firms are more likely to exhaust local currency 
lending markets and so depend to a greater extent on foreign markets.  
The negative and significant sign obtained for leverage suggests that access to foreign financial 
markets is more restricted for riskier firms, as will be analyzed in later sections in more detail. 
The operating margin exhibits a positive coefficient, which is higher for the crisis period, 
although not statistically significant. Firms that are more profitable tend to be less restricted to 
access foreign financial markets in turbulent periods.  
The dummy “previous issuer”, which indicates if the firm has issued dollar-denominated debt 
in the past, is positive and significant. This result probably reflects the role of the monitoring 
and agency cost theory according to which firms that issue debt in foreign markets are exposed 
to closer scrutiny. In addition, these firms are able to develop a reputation effect in foreign 
markets that make it easier for them to issue a larger stock of debt in foreign currencies.  
Importantly, the sign associated with the dummy variable denoting the existence of dollar-
denominated assets or revenues is positive and significant. The latter finding is consistent with 
the view that the roles of the dollar in trade and debt markets are intertwined (Gopinah and 
Stein, 2018). It is also consistent with recent evidence of Aabo et al. (2015) in the European 
5. Corporate basis and dollar borrowing by non-US firms 
Table 3 contains the results obtained from the estimation of equation (3). Column (I) refers to 
the whole sample period (ie, 2007Q1–2016Q4). We find that the corporate basis has a positive 
impact on the ratio of the amount of bonds issued in dollar relative to total bond borrowing in 
local currency and dollar. This is consistent with firms increasing their synthetic local 
borrowing, that is, issuing dollar bonds and swapping them into their home market when cost-
saving opportunities arise. In columns (II) and (III) we split the sample in two periods: crisis 
period (2007Q1–2012Q2) and post-crisis period (2012Q3–2016Q4). This split enables us to 
verify that firms exploit funding opportunities in a significant way in the post-crisis period, 
when bond issuance by the non-financial sector started to grow at a fast pace.11 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
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6.1. Credit risk  
The corporate basis tends to widen when CIP deviations are wider, which means that the 
demand for dollar safe assets is stronger (Liao, 2017). High-grade firms are natural candidates 
to benefit from this arbitrage funding opportunity, since as stated by Krishnamurthy and Lustig 
(2019) they can offer to investors closer substitutes of dollar safe assets in a context of safe 
assets’ scarcity. We now test whether the previous statement is true and explore if firms’ 
responses to funding opportunities depend on their risk as measured from their credit rating. 
Thus, we extend equation (3) with the interaction of our measure of funding opportunities (CB) 
and a dummy for very high-grade or safe firms: 
?????????????? ????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????????? ? ??????? ?
???????? ? ??????? ? ?????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? (4)   
where Safeit-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s rating is in the very high-
grade rating category, which we define as a rating above AA-, and zero if it is a high-yield, low 
investment grade or a non-rated firm (hereafter we refer to them as the “control group”). To 
context, showing that firms with direct asset exposure to euros, pounds, or Swedish kronar 
issue, on average, more bonds denominated in these currencies for hedging purposes (see also 
Allayannis et al., 2001; Aabo, 2006; or Hoberg and Moon, 2017; among others). The fact that 
foreign currency asset-side exposures increase firms’ issue of bonds in foreign currency 
suggests that firms aim at avoiding the build-up of balance-sheet currency mismatches. 
In Table 4, we extend the baseline results reported in Table 3 to a different sample of non-euro 
area firms by analyzing their EUR borrowing. In this case, we also consider US firms. The 
number of EUR bonds issued by non-euro area firms is much smaller and, as a result, the 
proportion of censored observations is much higher than in the analysis that uses the dollar as 
the reference currency. Therefore, the results should be taken with caution. With this caveat in 
mind, our main finding is that firms also respond to a positive corporate basis relative to the 
EUR, increasing their fraction of EUR borrowing during the post-crisis period. This evidence 
also supports the idea that firms may engage in synthetic local borrowing in euro area markets.  
< Insert Table 4 here > 
6. The role of firm-specific characteristics 
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interpret the interaction effect, we compute the marginal effect of a one standard deviation 
increase in the CB on the share of dollar borrowing, for two types of firm: high-grade firms 
and the control group.  
The results are summarized in column (I) of Table 5. We find that only very high-grade firms 
increase their dollar share in response to funding opportunities. Hence, the results indicate that 
safe firms are more prone to currency migration because of investors’ appetite for dollar safe 
assets. In column (II) of Table 5, we restrict the sample to those firms with a rating and results 
are very similar. 
One may argue that the effects associated with the firm rating category could be due, at least 
in part, to the firm size, given that very high-grade firms are more than three times larger than 
those in the control group. To disentangle the effect that is really due to firm risk but not to 
firm size, we extend the analyses further by matching very high-grade firms and the control 
group, according to their total assets. More specifically, we use coarsened exact matching 
(CEM) techniques to balance the size of groups of very high-grade firms and the control group. 
We use the baseline-matching algorithm (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2008) and obtain weights for 
each observation to adjust the imbalance in the size of very high-grade firms and the ones in 
the control group. Then, we run weighted regressions using the CEM weights. Since firms in a 
very high-grade rating category are larger, this methodology overweights small firms with very 
In columns (IV) to (IV), we extend the previous analysis to the issuances of bonds denominated 
in euros. Importantly, once we use the CEM technique, we do not find a significant response 
of safe firms to the deviations in the corporate basis. This may reflect that the positive corporate 
bases relative to the euro are driven by the strong compression in credit spreads in euro-
denominated bonds (relative to home currency bond markets), and do not signal a strong 
preference of euro-denominated safe assets by international investors.  
In order to corroborate the above results, we consider additional proxies for firm risk and 
estimate the GLM model using new CEM weights to adjust the imbalance in the size of safe 
firms for each risk measure. The analysis is reported in Table 6. In column (II) we use a risk 
measure based on the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968). More specifically, we use a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the firm is above the percentile 75 of the distribution (ie, the Z-
score above 2.8). Results are fully consistent with those contained in column (I), which 
high-grade rating category (and large firms in the control group). The results are reported in 
column (III) of Table 5 and are fully consistent with those in column (I) and (1I).  
< Insert Table 5 here > 
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6.2.  Dollar assets 
Dollar asset-side exposures increase firms’ dollar borrowing, since companies tend to match 
the currency composition of asset and liabilities. For the same reason, they may dampen firms’ 
response to the corporate basis, which reflects the scope for substituting local for synthetic 
local currency debt. To examine this aspect, we augment equation (3) with an interaction term 
between the corporate basis and the dummy variable for asset-side dollar exposures used in 
equation (2): 
?????????????? ????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ?????? ? ????? ?
?????? ? ?????? ? ?????    (5) 
The marginal effects reported in column (I) of Table 7 are obtained for firms with and without 
dollar asset exposures. The results show that only firms without dollar asset-side exposures 
issue dollar-denominated bonds when the corporate basis widens.  
< Insert Table 7 here > 
Next, we distinguish between firms with dollar long-term assets and revenues (that is, 
operational or accounting exposures, respectively). Specifically, we define two binary 
variables: one measuring dollar accounting exposures (???????) that takes value one if a firm 
has long-term assets in dollars and another one assessing dollar operational exposures (?????) 
that takes value one if a firm has dollar revenues. According to Aabo, Hansen, and Muradoglu 
(2015), the two measures convey different information: the accounting exposure proxy reflects 
long-term balance-sheet exposures, whereas the operational exposure proxy gauges short-term 
cash-flow exposures. The distinction is important, since the two types of exposure are 
associated with different hedging needs. Columns (II) and (III) of Table 7 show, alternatively, 
the results obtained using the dummy for accounting and operational exposures, and their 
interactions with the corporate basis. Firms without dollar long-term assets or revenues in 
reproduce column (III) of Table 5 for comparability reasons, and suggest that safe firms 
arbitrage the deviations in the corporate basis to a higher extent. Column (III) contains the 
results obtained for an alternative proxy that classifies firms as safe when the distance to default 
is in the top quartile of the distribution for the firms in our sample. The distance to default is 
obtained as in Bharath and Shumway (2008), who use a reduced-form model inspired by the 
model to price corporate bond debt in Merton (1974). In this case the results are also 
qualitatively similar. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
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dollars issue dollar-denominated bonds when the corporate basis widens, whereas firms with 
dollar long-term assets or revenues do not.  
The size of dollar asset-side exposures varies considerably across firms, with some firms 
reporting positive but negligible exposures. As a result, our binary variables do not perfectly 
gauge the importance of dollar asset-side exposures. To overcome this problem, we substitute 
each binary variable for a continuous measure: the fraction of dollar revenues (long-term 
assets) to total revenues (long-term assets). A second issue associated with the measures of 
dollar exposures – in the form of either assets or revenues – is that they may reflect firm size. 
To make sure we are not capturing the impact of firm size on the share of dollar borrowing, we 
construct an orthogonalized ratio of dollar exposures, regressing each of the ratios on total 
assets and using the residual in place of the continuous measure of exposures. Column (IV) 
reports the results using the ratio of dollar long-term assets whereas column (V) contains the 
results obtained when we use the orthogonalized ratio. Columns (VI) and (VII) are analogous 
to the two previous columns but using the measure of dollar revenues.  
The marginal effects in columns (IV) to (VII) are obtained for firms without and with dollar 
asset-side exposures (defined as one standard deviation above the mean). Results in columns 
(IV) and (V) show that firms without long-term dollar assets are more likely to issue dollar 
bonds when the corporate basis widens than their peers. Firms without dollar revenues are also 
less responsive to the corporate basis, independently of whether we measure their exposures 
with a continuous variable (column VI) or if it is orthogonalized (column VII). 
Taken together, these results suggest that only firms without dollar exposures react to 
deviations in the corporate basis (column I). This result holds for accounting (columns II, IV 
and V) and operational exposures (columns III, VI and VII). The last finding is consistent with 
McBrady and Schill (2007), but importantly we complement their evidence documenting that 
firms without accounting exposures also react more to FX-hedged cost-saving opportunities. 
A caveat of our analysis is that we have measured operational dollar exposures exploiting the 
geographical breakdown of assets disclosed in the financial statements. However, companies 
outside the United States may have operational exposures when they operate in certain sectors. 
Thus, we modify our measure of operational exposures, and assume that firms from the 
“Utilities” and “Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction” sectors have dollar 
operational exposures (they represent 11% and 7% of the firms in our sample, respectively).12 
                                                            
12 NAICS codes 20 and 21. 
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13 We exclude non-rated firms from this analysis. 
To evaluate the economic magnitude of our findings, we depict in Figure 5 the impact of the 
corporate basis on dollar borrowing for the two types of firm based on their risk and exposure 
to the dollar. In the left-hand panel we plot the impact of the corporate basis on dollar borrowing 
by very high-grade firms and the other firms (control group), using the results reported in 
column I of Table 8. The fraction of dollar borrowing by very high-grade firms (red dots) 
increases by 23 pp when the corporate basis increases from its mean value to twice its standard 
6.3. Composition of the pool of borrowers 
In this section, we study the effects of the corporate basis conditioning jointly on firms’ risk 
and dollar asset-side exposures. In particular, we extend equation (3) with the interaction of the 
corporate basis and (i) the high-grade firm dummy (equal to one when the rating is above AA- 
and zero otherwise)13, and (ii) measures of asset-side exposure to the dollar. Specifically, we 
consider three proxies for dollar exposures. In column (I) of Table 8, we use a composite 
measure: the simple average of the ratio of dollar revenues and the ratio of long-term dollar 
assets. As in the previous section, each ratio is orthogonalized by regressing it on total assets. 
In columns (II) and (III) we use the (orthogonalized) ratio of long-term dollar assets and 
revenues, respectively.  
                                                            
The results (not reported for the sake of brevity) are very similar to those obtained in Table 7, 
which further confirms that firms with no dollar asset-side exposures are more sensitive to FX-
hedged funding opportunities. 
The results imply that the composition of dollar borrowers changes when the corporate basis 
widens. Specifically, a widening in the corporate basis increases the fraction of dollar bonds 
issued by very high-grade firms and firms with no dollar assets or revenues.  
Then, we tackle potential biases due to the larger size of very high-grade firms and estimate 
the GLM model using CEM weights, which are obtained as in Section 6.1. Column (IV) shows 
the results obtained when we use the average of the (orthogonalized) ratio of dollar revenues 
and the (orthogonalized) ratio of long-term dollar assets whereas columns (V) and (VI) refer 
the (orthogonalized) ratio of long-term dollar assets and revenues, respectively. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained in columns (I) – (III). 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
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< Insert Figure 5 here > 
We also show that the response differs across types of firm. Very high-grade firms take greater 
advantage of FX hedged funding opportunities, as they can offer investors a closer substitute 
for dollar safe assets in the context of a scarcity of safe assets. This result holds for different 
measures of firms’ credit risk (ie, high Altman z-score, or greater distance to default). 
Similarly, firms without dollar-asset exposures react more to the widening of the corporate 
basis. By contrast, firms with higher dollar revenues or long-term assets borrow more heavily 
in dollars, but they do not react to changes in dollar funding opportunity, reflecting their 
operational needs. Altogether, the composition of dollar borrowers shifts when the corporate 
basis widens, as high-grade firms gain importance, relative to firms with operational needs. 
deviation. The fraction of dollar borrowing by the firms in the control group (blue dots) remains 
almost flat at 25 pp independently of the level of the corporate basis. 
The right-hand panel of Figure 5, also based on the results reported in column I of Table 8, 
shows the increase in the fraction of dollar borrowing by firms with local assets and dollar 
assets. For companies with assets in local currencies (red dots), a similar widening in the 
corporate basis (twice the standard deviation) leads to a 15 pp increase in the share of dollar 
borrowing. Despite this increase, the share of dollar borrowing by firms with dollar exposures 
(blue dots) is constantly higher than the one of firms without dollar exposures independently 
of the change in the corporate basis but remains flat at 35 pp. Comparing the red dots in the 
two panels in Figure 5, it is evident that the corporate basis increases dollar borrowing by very 
high-grade firms to a much greater extent, relative to firms with local currency assets (ie the 
red dots in the left-hand panel are structurally higher than those in the right-hand panel).   
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse how firms headquartered in advanced economies switch their bond 
borrowing across currencies in response to FX-hedged cost-saving opportunities. We find that 
non-US firms increase their dollar issuances when the pairwise differential in the corporate 
basis (defined as the relative cost of local to synthetic currency borrowing) is larger than the 
cost of swapping the dollar proceeds into domestic currency.  
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14 To measure the geographical breakdown of revenues we use external revenues, which measures revenues 
acquired from external customers. 
15 For instance, Linde AG booked 5% of its long-term assets in Australia, and had an AUD bond outstanding. 
Figure A.1 provides the geographical segment breakdown disclosed by Linde AG in 2017. 
Linde AG is a Germany-based company engaged in industrial gases manufacture. The 
company books 10% of its long-term assets in the United States (left-hand side of the figure), 
where it obtains 23% of its external revenues. Consistently, with its high geographical 
diversification, Linde AG had 18 outstanding bonds as of April 2019, issued in four different 
currencies (US dollar, euros, British pound, and Australian dollar).15 This example suggests 
that the geographical location of assets and revenue conditions the currency denomination of 
bonds. 
Appendix. Geographical segment breakdown 
In this appendix, we describe the use of the geographical breakdown of long-term assets and 
revenues provided in the notes to the financial statements. According to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), public companies are obliged to disclose information 
about their operating segments, products and services, the geographical areas in which they 
operate, and their major customers. In particular, they need to disclose their non-current assets 
and revenues by area and, when exposures are material, by individual country.14 As part of the 
consolidated financial statements, the geographical breakdowns are audited and thus duly 
reflect the asset-side exposures of companies.  
 














Example of geographical segment breakdown. Linde AG                                                            
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Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon 
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Note: Evolution of the c-USD residualized credit spread estimated from equation (1).  
Source: own elaboration, Bloomberg, Thompson Reuters Eikon 
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Note: Evolution of the corporate basis, obtained from equation (2). This is the difference between the CIP deviation (cross-currency basis) 
and the residualized credit spread obtained from equation (1) 
Source: own elaboration, Bloomberg, Thompson Reuters Eikon 
CHF CAD EUR GBP JPY
Corporate basis, relative to the US dollar 








Corporate basis EUR, relative to the US dollar. Breakdown. 








Note: Decomposition of the USD-EUR corporate basis, as the sum of the residualized credit spread (dashed red line), and the CIP deviation 
(cross-currency basis, dashed yellow line) 
Source: own elaboration, Bloomberg, Thompson Reuters Eikon 
Residualized credit spread Corporate basis Cross-currency basis (CIP deviation)
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1   This figure shows the impact of the corporate basis on dollar borrowing for different types of firm, using Column (I) in Table 8. Panel A 
breaks them down according to their credit risk (very high-grade, vs the rest); and Panel B by the currency composition of their assets (local 
and dollar assets). The impact differs across the levels of the covered credit spread (standardized around its mean) reported on the horizontal 
axis. In Panel B firms with dollar (local) assets are those with a ratio of long-term assets to total assets at the 75th (25th) percentile.   
Source: own elaboration. 
All firms Other Very high grade All firms Dollar assets Local assets
Table 1. Firm-level variables 
Panel A. Non-US firms 
p25 p50 p75 mean 
Leverage 15% 27% 41% 27% 
Price to book 1.1 1.6 2.4 2.1 
Operating margin 4% 7% 13% 10% 
Tangible assets ratio  32% 67% 99% 70% 
Current ratio 88% 116% 148% 129% 
Total Assets (in USD millions) 6,410 17,200 46,900 42,700 
Panel B. Non-euro area firms 
p25 p50 p75 mean 
Leverage 12% 28% 40% 24% 
Price to book 1.3 2.0 3.4 3.7 
Operating margin 3% 9% 16% -50%
Tangible assets ratio  18% 47% 88% 56%
Current ratio 94% 130% 188% 182%
Total Assets (in USD millions) 3,100 9,930 30,400 30,000 
Source: Thompson Reuters. 
Fraction of dollar borrowing and ??????????????????? 1 
In per cent Figure 5
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 Total          17,828          6,786            518          2,843            263            768  
Table 2: Bond issuances by currency 
Total         23,174          7,293          1,028          4,397            513          1,187  
              
Panel A. Number of bond issued, by currency     
              
Panel B. Number of local currency bond issued, by currency   
              
  USD JPY GBP EUR CHF CAD 
              
Pre–2007          9,252          3,099            438          1,384            115            363  
2007             900            346              64            161              30              43  
2008          1,297            521              75            236              62              67  
2009          1,183            357              81            277              42              58  
2010          1,909            607              44            249              27            107  
2011          1,050            324              24            146              37              67  
2012          1,365            357              51            267              42              94  
2013          1,364            349              34            288              23              88  
2014          1,341            325              54            294              39              87  
2015          1,641            360              47            388              47              76  
2016          1,872            648            116            707              49            137  
              
  USD JPY GBP EUR CHF CAD 
              
Pre–2007          6,818          2,826            200            888              51            228  
2007             681            322              34              87              12              17  
2008             978            459              43            129              23              37  
2009             918            333              50            222              29              52  
2010          1,505            563              29            186              16              94  
2011             853            298              11            114              23              48  
2012          1,058            338              23            216              30              57  
2013          1,048            340              12            211              13              60  
2014          1,070            320              25            197              21              63  
2015          1,362            351              18            214              20              46  
2016          1,537            636              73            379              25              66  
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   USD   JPY   GBP   EUR   CHF   CAD   
               
 Pre-2007           2,434            273            238            496              64            135   
2007             219              24              30              74              18              26   
2008             319              62              32            107              39              30   
2009             265              24              31              55              13                6   
2010             404              44              15              63              11              13   
2011             197              26              13              32              14              19   
2012             307              19              28              51              12              37   
2013             316                9              22              77              10              28   
2014             271                5              29              97              18              24   
2015             279                9              29            174              27              30   
2016             335              12              43            328              24              71   
Table 2: Bond issuances by currency (cont.) 
               
Panel C. Number of foreign currency bond issued, by currency    
 Total           5,346            507            510          1,554            250            419   
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Table 3: Non-US firms’ US dollar bond borrowing 
Observations 4,005 2,094 1,911 
Firm Controls YES YES YES 
Country Controls YES YES YES 
Rating FE YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Currency FE YES YES YES 
 
where G(.) is the logistic link function, the covered credit spread (CBcUSD,t) is the sum of the residualized credit spread of 
currency c and the deviations from currency c-USD covered interest rate parity. It reflects the cost saving of a firm conducting
synthetic local currency borrowing (ie, issuing a fixed-coupon bond in dollars and swapping the proceeds back into an 
equivalent domestic currency bond, relative to issuing a domestic currency bond). ???? is a dummy variable that takes value 
1 if the firm has long-term dollar assets or revenues, and zero otherwise. ? coefficients indicate the use of currency (c), year-
quarter (t), and rating category (r) fixed effects. The vector ????? represents a set of lagged firm specific control variables:
price-to-book, operating margin, total assets, leverage, and previous issuance dummy, and dollar asset-side exposure. We 
included several economic area/country lagged specific variables (??????: sovereign yield differential, exchange rate
volatility, public debt to GDP, current account balance to GDP, and GDP growth. All variables are standardized. Panel A 
reports the coefficients and Panel B the marginal effects of one-standard deviation change in the covered credit spread and
the marginal effected associated with firms with dollar exposure. Column I is estimated using the whole sample (2007Q1–
2016Q4), and columns II and II correspond to the results obtained with two subsamples (2007Q1–2012Q2 and 2012Q3–
2016Q4, respectively). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the currency- quarter level). Both the coefficients 
and standards errors are reported in percentage points (i.e., they are multiplied by 100). The symbols *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: FCR=USD Debt / (USD Debt + Local Curr Debt)   
  I II III 
  2007Q1-2016Q4 2007Q1-2012Q2 2012Q3-2016Q4 
Panel A: Coefficients       
Corporate basis 0.145* 0.042 0.577** 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.24) 
USD asset-side exposure 0.426*** 0.365** 0.440*** 
  (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) 
PriceToBook 0.03 0.089 -0.05 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Operating margin 0.049 0.075 0.036 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
Total assets 0.275*** 0.207** 0.311** 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.14) 
Leverage -0.096** -0.211*** 0.019 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Previous issuer 0.491*** 0.512*** 0.479*** 
  (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) 
Panel B: Marginal effect of       
Corporate basis 1.58* 0.47 5.92** 
  (0.88) (1.02) (2.46) 
This table shows the determinants of the fraction of dollar bond issuances to total bond issuances, which is bounded between 
zero and one, by non-US non-financial firms (FCRicrt), at a quarterly frequency. We estimate the following equation using a 
GLM (Generalized Linear Model) with a logistic link function:                                                                                                  
?????????????????? ????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ???? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ??????
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Table 4. Marginal effect of the corporate basis (CB) on firms' foreign currency bond borrowing. 
Euro borrowing by non-Euro Area firms. 
  I II III 
  2007Q1-2016Q4 2007Q1-2012Q2 2012Q3-2016Q4 
Marginal effect of       
Corporate basis 1.36* 0.24 3.91* 
  (0.80) (0.48) (2.11) 
Observations 7,468 3,872 3,596 
Firm Controls YES YES YES 
Country Controls YES YES YES 
Rating FE YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Currency FE YES YES YES 
This table shows the determinants of the fraction of euro bond issuances to total bond issuances, which is bounded
between zero and one, by non- Euro Area non-financial firms (FCRicrt), at a quarterly frequency. We estimate the
following equation using a GLM (Generalized Linear Model) with a logistic link function 
 
  ?????????????????? ???????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ??????
 
where G(.) is the logistic link function, the corporate basis (CBcEUR,t) is the sum of the residualized credit spread 
of currency c and the deviations from currency c-EUR covered interest rate parity. It reflects the cost saving of a 
firm conducting synthetic local currency borrowing (ie, issuing a fixed-coupon bond in euros and swapping the 
proceeds back into an equivalent domestic currency bond, relative to issuing a domestic currency bond). We report 
only the marginal effect of one-standard deviation change in the covered credit spread on the expected value of 
the ratio of foreign currency borrowing. The set of control variables is the same used in Table 3 but using euros 
as the reference currency with the exception of the euro-asset side exposure which is not available in that currency. 
Column I is estimated using the whole sample (2007Q1–2016Q4), and columns II and III correspond to the results 
obtained with two subsamples (2007Q1–2012Q2 and 2012Q3–2016Q4, respectively). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered at the currency- quarter level). Both the coefficients and standards errors are reported in 
percentage points (i.e., they are multiplied by 100). The symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: FCR=EUR Debt / (EUR Debt + Local Curr Debt) 
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Dep. variable FCR:  USD/(USD+Local Curr Debt) EUR/(EUR+LC Local Curr Debt) 
  I II III IV V VI 
Safe 5.59*** 4.30*** 5.85*** 5.17* 3.16 5.54 
  (1.65) (1.57) (2.09) (2.99) (3.02) (3.75) 
Rest 0.33 -1.59 3.45 0.64 -0.29 0.47 
  (0.88) (1.32) (2.79) (0.76) (1.03) (1.90) 
Observations 4,005 2,162 811 8,134 5,316 3,667 
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Rating FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Currency FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 5. Conditional marginal effects of the corporate basis (CB) on foreign currency bond 
borrowing depending on firms’ rating 
This table shows the determinants of the fraction of dollar (euro) bond issuances to total bond issuances, which is 
bounded between zero and one, by non-US (non-Euro Area) non-financial firms (FCRicrt), at a quarterly frequency. 
To explore if the impact of the corporate basis depends on firms' risk we modify the original equation used in 
Table 3 including an interaction term and estimate the following equation using a GLM (Generalized Linear 





? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??????????? ? ?????????? ? ??????????? ????????? ? ??????
? ?????? ? ?????? 
 
where G(.) is the logistic link function and Safeit-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s rating is 
in the very high-grade rating category, which we define as a rating above AA-, and zero if it is a high-yield, low 
investment grade category or it is not rated (hereafter we refer to them as the “control group”). The corporate basis 
(CBcDomC,t) is the sum of the residualized credit spread of currency c and the deviations from currency c-USD (c- 
EUR) covered interest rate parity. We report only the marginal effect of one-standard deviation change in the 
covered credit spread on the expected value of the ratio of foreign currency borrowing for very high-grade firms 
(i.e., Safeit-1 is equal to one) and the control group (i.e., Safeit-1 is equal to one). All models include the covariates 
described in Table 3. Columns I - III report the results obtained when the foreign currency is the dollar (USD) and 
the sample consists of non-US firms whereas columns IV and VI contain the results obtained when the foreign 
currency is the euro (EUR) and the sample consists of non-Euro Area firms. In columns I and IV we use the whole 
sample of firms whereas in columns II and V we restrict the sample to those firms with a rating. In columns III 
and V, we use coarsened exact matching (CEM) techniques to balance the size of groups of very high-grade firms 
and the rest of firms with a rating. We use the baseline matching algorithm (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2008), and 
obtain weights for each observation. Then, we run weighted GLM regressions using the CEM weights. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the currency- quarter level). Both the coefficients and standards errors 
are reported in percentage points (i.e., they are multiplied by 100). The symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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 Rating 




 I II III 
Safe 5.85*** 3.06* 4.32* 
  (2.09) (1.83) (2.51) 
Rest 3.45 0.39 0.79 
  (2.79) (1.05) (1.38) 
Observations 811 3,873 2,489 
Firm Controls YES YES YES 
Country Controls YES YES YES 
Rating FE YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Currency FE YES YES YES 
Table 6. Conditional marginal effects of the corporate basis (CB) on foreign currency bond 
borrowing depending on firms’ risk 
 
This table shows the determinants of the fraction of dollar bond issuances to total bond issuances, which is 
bounded between zero and one, by non-US non-financial firms (FCRicrt), at a quarterly frequency. To explore if 
the impact of the corporate basis depends on firms’ risk we modify the original equation used in Table 3 including 







? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????? ? ?????????? ? ?????????? ????????? ? ????????
? ?????? 
where G(.) is the logistic link function and Safeit-1 is the measure of firms’ credit risk. In column (I) we measure 
the firm’s risk based on a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s rating is in the very high-grade rating 
category, which we define as a rating above AA-, and zero if it is a high-yield or low investment grade category 
(i.e., we exclude non-rated firms). In column (II) we use a risk measure based on the Altman Z-score. More 
specifically, we use a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is in the top quartile of the Z-score distribution 
for the firms in our sample, which means it is in the “safe” zone. In column (III) we use an alternative proxy that 
classifies firms as risky when the distance to default is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of distance to 
default measures for the firms in our sample. The corporate basis (???????? ) is the sum of the residualized credit 
spread of currency c and the deviations from currency c-USD covered interest rate parity. We use coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) techniques to balance the size of groups of firms within the safe category and the rest of the 
firms . We use the baseline matching algorithm (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2008), and obtain weights for each 
observation. Then, we run weighted GLM regressions using the CEM weights. We report only the marginal effect 
of one-standard deviation change in the corporate basis on the expected value of the ratio of foreign currency 
borrowing for safe and riskier firms according to the definition in each column. All models include the covariates 
described in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the currency- quarter level). Both the 
coefficients and standards errors are reported in percentage points (i.e., they are multiplied by 100). The symbols 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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 Exposure: yes/no Exposure: continuous measure 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
USD Asset-side exposure: NO 1.91*       
 (1.07)       
USD Asset-side exposure: YES 0.33       
 (1.01)       
USD LT assets: NO  1.72*  1.76** 2.00**   
  (0.96)  (0.86) (0.88)   
USD LT assets: YES  -0.15  -0.09 -0.26   
  (1.21)  (1.00) (1.03)   
USD Revenues: NO   1.76*   2.34** 2.61*** 
   (1.06)   (0.91) (0.95) 
USD Revenues: YES   0.39   -0.36 -0.34 
    (1.02)   (1.04) (1.04) 
Observations 4,005 4,005 4,005 4,005 4,005 4,005 4,005 
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Rating FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 7. Conditional marginal effects of the corporate basis (CB) on foreign 
currency bond borrowing depending on firms’ dollar exposures 
This table shows the determinants of the fraction of dollar bond issuances to total bond issuances, which is bounded 
between zero and one, by non-US non-financial firms (FCRicrt), at a quarterly frequency. To explore if the impact of 
the corporate basis depends on firms' risk we modify the original equation used in Table 3 including an interaction 
term and estimate the following equation using a GLM (Generalized Linear Model) with a logistic link function: 
 
?????????????????? ????????
? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??????????? ? ??????? ? ?????????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? 
 
where G(.) is the logistic link function and ????? is a dummy variable that denotes the existence of dollar long-term 
assets and/or revenues. More specifically, in column (I) this variable equal to one when the firm has assets or revenues 
in USD whereas in columns (II) and (III) we split the measure in two and distinguish between both exposures such that 
column (II) refers to long-term assets in USD and column (III) to the existence of revenues in that currency. In columns 
(IV) – (VII) we use a continuous measure. Column (IV) reports the results using the continuous variable of dollar long-
term assets whereas column (V) contains the results obtained when we use the orthogonalized variable (the 
orthogonalized measure is the residual that is obtained after regressing the continuous variable measuring dollar 
exposures on total assets). Columns (VI) and (VII) are analogous to the two previous columns but using the measure 
of dollar revenues. The corporate basis (????????? ) is the differential in the corporate basis of currency c in excess of 
the deviations from currency c-USD covered interest rate parity. In columns (I) – (III) we report only the marginal 
effect of one-standard deviation change in the corporate basis on the expected value of the ratio of foreign currency 
borrowing for firms with and without dollar exposures according to the definition in each column. The marginal effects 
in columns (IV) – (VII) are obtained for firms whose exposures are one standard deviation above the mean and for the 
rest of firms. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the currency- quarter level). Both the coefficients and 
standards errors are reported in percentage points (i.e., they are multiplied by 100). The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  I II III IV V VI 
Safe 6.20*** 6.36*** 5.91*** 9.20*** 9.49*** 9.34*** 
  (2.00) (2.01) (2.00) (2.87) (2.94) (2.86) 
Rest -1.62 -1.66 -1.52 4.48 4.33 5.19* 
  (1.39) (1.38) (1.39) (3.05) (2.99) (3.13) 
USD Asset-side exposure: NO 4.66***     7.23**     
  (1.51)     (2.91)     
USD Asset-side exposure: YES -2.16     5.10     
  (2.22)     (3.14)     
USD LT assets: NO   4.15***     6.91**   
    (1.48)     (2.71)   
USD LT assets: YES   -0.66     5.67*   
    (1.85)     (2.95)   
USD Revenues: NO     4.35***     8.78*** 
      (1.49)     (3.19) 
USD Revenues: YES     1.08     3.23 
      (1.47)     (3.14) 
Observations 2,162 2,162 2,162 811 811 811 
Table 8. Conditional marginal effects of the corporate basis (CB) on foreign currency bond 
borrowing depending on firms’ rating and dollar exposures 
 
This table shows the determinants of the fraction of dollar bond issuances to total bond issuances, which is 
bounded between zero and one, by non-US non-financial firms (FCRicst), at a quarterly frequency. To explore if 
the impact of the corporate basis depends on firms' risk we modify the original equation used in Table 3 including 







? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?????????? ? ?????????? ? ?????????? ????????? ? ???????
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where G(.) is the logistic link function and Safeit-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s rating is 
in the very high-grade rating category, which we define as a rating above AA-, and zero if it is a high-yield or 
low investment grade category (i.e., we exclude non-rated firms). ????? is a variable that measures the existence 
of dollar long-term assets and/or revenues. More specifically, in columns I and IV this variable is equal to the 
average of the (orthogonalized) ratio of dollar revenues and the (orthogonalized) ratio of long-term dollar assets. 
Columns II and V are obtained using the (orthogonalized) ratio of long-term dollar assets whereas columns III 
and VI are obtained using the (orthogonalized) ratio of dollar revenues. The corporate basis (???????? ) is the 
differential in the residualized credit spread of currency c and the deviations from currency c-USD covered 
interest rate parity. In columns IV – VI we use coarsened exact matching (CEM) techniques to balance the size 
of groups of firms within the safe category and the rest of the firms. We use the baseline matching algorithm 
(Iacus, King, and Porro, 2008), and obtain weights for each observation. Then, we run weighted GLM regressions 
using the CEM weights. We report only the marginal effect of one-standard deviation change in the covered credit 
spread on the expected value of the ratio of foreign currency borrowing for very high-grade (i.e., Safeit-1 is equal 
to one) and the rest of rated firms (i.e., Safeit-1 is equal to one). All models include the covariates described in 
Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the currency- quarter level). Both the coefficients and 
standards errors are reported in percentage points (i.e., they are multiplied by 100). The symbols *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All models include firm and country controls, 
and rating, quarter, and currency FE. 
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